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INTRODUCTION 
“The idea that the protection of human rights knows no 
international boundaries and that the international community 
has an obligation to ensure that governments guarantee and 
 
∗ Kathleen Renée Cronin-Furman is a 2006 graduate of Columbia Law School.  
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protect human rights has gradually captured the imagination 
of mankind.”1 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)2 is the 
founding document of the law of human rights. But in addition to its 
role as the progenitor of an ever-increasing body of convention-
based human rights law, the normative impact of the UDHR can be 
felt in the activist efforts of individuals and groups who protest 
violations of, and ensure respect for, the human rights of people 
whom they have never met. Despite the fact that the body of human 
rights law stemming from the UDHR only enshrines obligations 
upon states and organizations made up of states, the UDHR’s 
powerful moral focus has fostered the development of a 
contemporary “individual responsibility to protect” norm. 
The UDHR’s moral, rather than legal, focus arose both out of the 
desire to respond forcefully to the evils perpetrated by Nazi 
Germany3 and the reluctance on the part of powerful states to take on 
legal obligations that would impinge upon their sovereignty. 
Consequently, while the UDHR represents a profound statement of 
global unanimity on the moral rights of individuals, its drafting 
history reveals a clear intent not to impose corresponding legal duties 
upon states.4 Although the UDHR was intended as an immediate 
precursor to an international bill of rights that would impose binding 
legal obligations upon states, nearly three decades passed before 
those obligations entered into force.5 In the intervening twenty-eight 
years, the global public’s growing awareness of the concept of  
 
 1. Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 703, 704 (1997). 
 2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 3. See JAMES AVERY JOYCE, THE NEW POLITICS OF RIGHTS 45 (St. Martin’s 
Press 1978) (“The Universal Declaration was humanity’s unanimous response to 
the Nazi death camps, the fleeing refugees, and the tortured prisoners of war.”). 
 4. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 354, 356 (1948) (remarking that the drafters were relatively 
undisturbed by the idea of a acknowledging universal human rights without also 
providing a binding legal framework for the enforcement of those rights). 
 5. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Jan. 3, 
1976, 933 U.N.T.S. 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 99 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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universal human rights was based upon the moral imperatives 
expressed by the UDHR. 
This moral inflection to our understanding of human rights has 
persisted despite the creation of an extensive legal regime dedicated 
to promoting and protecting human rights. One of the most effective 
methods for encouraging state compliance with the dictates of human 
rights law has been the practice of focusing moral opprobrium upon 
violators, popularly known as “naming and shaming.”6 Cynics might 
suggest that this use of moral sanction has arisen solely because of 
imperfect legal enforcement. It is certainly true that states have little 
incentive to police one another’s compliance with the legal regime 
given that violations pose no obvious detriment to the potentially 
enforcing states. However, the power and efficacy of “naming and 
shaming” suggest that its persistent use must stem from more than 
just the inadequacy of legal enforcement: it is derived from the 
UDHR’s encapsulation of the idea that human rights are 
accompanied by moral obligations.7 
This idea that the international community has moral obligations 
to individuals has recently been the subject of discussion in the 
debate over the emerging Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) norm. 
R2P is an effort at providing new moral guidelines to humanitarian 
intervention that recharacterizes sovereignty as responsibility.8 States 
have an obligation to protect their citizens from humanitarian 
disaster, and when they fail, that obligation falls upon the 
international community. 
 
 
 6. See discussion infra, § II.b. 
 7. See UDHR, supra note 2, paras. 6, 8 (recognizing that U.N. member states 
have pledged to respect, observe, and protect human rights and proclaiming that 
every nation should strive to secure the human rights standards detailed in the 
UDHR). 
 8. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, §§ 2.14-2.15 (Dec. 
2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT] (challenging U.N. Charter signatories to 
recognize sovereignty not as control but as both an internal and external 
responsibility to protect, including 1) the responsibility of state authorities to the 
citizens, 2) the responsibility of national political authorities to citizens and to the 
global community, and 3) accountability on the part of state actors for their 
actions). 
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In addition to laying the groundwork for the emerging R2P norm, 
the UDHR has also fostered the idea that it is incumbent upon the 
individual, as a member of the global community, to promote and 
protect human rights.9 This conviction can be seen in the literature of 
current campaigns to end genocide that implicitly base their calls for 
individual participation on a moral obligation grounded in human 
rights.10 In this way, the UDHR’s normative impact as the moral 
compact of the global community continues to grow. 
I. THE UDHR’S MORAL FOCUS 
Mary Robinson, the former U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, has described the UDHR as “one of the great aspirational 
documents of our human history.”11 The document arose out of the 
international community’s horror-stricken desire to send a firm 
message of “never again” regarding the atrocities of the Holocaust.12 
However, the UDHR itself reflects the realities of compromise 
between the new commitment to human rights and resistance to 
relinquishing state sovereignty.13 
Although the UDHR represents a “ringing declaration that all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”14 its 
drafters were careful to ensure that its provisions would have no 
binding legal effect.15 The mandate to impose legal obligations upon 
 
 9. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. para. 8. 
 10. See, e.g., infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (examining techniques 
used to call individuals to action to respond to the current situation in The Sudan). 
 11. Mary Robinson, UN High Comm’r for Human Rights, Romanes Lecture at 
Oxford University: Realizing Human Rights: “Take Hold of it Boldly and Duly . . 
.” (Nov. 11, 1997), http://www.un.org/rights/50/dpi1938.htm. 
 12. See Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the Universal Declaration, 15 
HUMAN RTS. Q. 357, 357-58 (1993) (explaining that the drafters intended the 
UDHR not only as a response to the Second World War, but also as a way to 
enshrine universal human rights in a way that would outlast the memories of the 
War). 
 13. See Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 356 (“The practical unanimity of the 
Members of the United Nations in stressing the importance of the [UDHR] was 
accompanied by an equally general repudiation of the idea that the [UDHR] 
imposed upon them a legal obligation to respect the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms which it proclaimed.”). 
 14. Oscar Schachter, The Genesis of the Declaration: A Fresh Examination, 11 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 27, 57 (1999). 
 15. See Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: 
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states was reserved for the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), which followed 
twenty-eight years later. 
A. THE CALL FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENT 
With the world still reeling from the horrors of the Holocaust, the 
international community struggled to reconstitute itself in the 
aftermath of World War II. The League of Nations’s failure to 
prevent the war made it clear that a new international organization 
was needed to promote international peace and security.16 Although 
the term “United Nations” initially referred to those nations united in 
war against the Axis powers,17 the Allies quickly began to use it in 
their discussions of a successor organization to the League of 
Nations. 
Nazi Germany’s persecution of Jews and other minorities had 
made it apparent that a government’s abuse of its citizens could no 
longer be considered a matter of purely domestic concern,18 and in 
the early 1940s global public opinion militated strongly for “some 
sort of human rights plank in the eventual peace treaties.”19 The 
drafters of the U.N. Charter agreed that providing for human rights 
should be one of the primary aims of the new global organization, 
committing the newly formed United Nations to work to “achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
 
Is It Still Right for the United States? 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 262 (2008) 
(observing that contemporaneous records of the drafting committee’s discussions 
emphasized the committee’s determination that the power of the UDHR would lie 
in its moral correctness rather than the imposition of legally binding obligations). 
 16. See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 706 (discussing the theory that Hitler’s 
rise to power may have been prevented if there had been a stronger international 
organization than the League of Nations in existence). 
 17. United Nations, Joint Declaration of the United Nations on the Cooperative 
War Effort of the Democracies (Jan. 2, 1942), in DEP’T ST. BULL., Jan. 3, 1942, at 
3 (welcoming other nations to be part of a Joint Declaration by the United Nations 
if those other nations also opposed Hitler). 
 18. See Morsink, supra note 12, at 358 (“The horrors of the Holocaust shocked 
the delegates and the countries they represented into a reaffirmation and reiteration 
of the existence of human rights.”) 
 19. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 1 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1999). 
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economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.”20 In line with this goal, Article 55 of the 
Charter states that “the United Nations shall promote . . . universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”21 
Despite proposals to define these “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,” the Charter did not itself enumerate them.22 That task was 
given to the newly established Commission on Human Rights (“the 
Commission”). The Commission was asked to prepare an 
international bill of rights which would “serve as a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples of all nations.”23 
B. THE DRAFTING OF THE UDHR 
The Commission on Human Rights, chaired by U.S. representative 
Eleanor Roosevelt, met for the first time in early 1947. It comprised 
eighteen members, with five representing the great powers, and 
thirteen representing the rotating members.24 In response to the call 
for an international bill of rights the commission decided that it 
would produce three instruments: first, “a non-binding declaration to 
be adopted by the General Assembly under its recommendatory 
authority,” second, a bill of rights, and third, a “Methods of 
Implementation” document.25 The French representative, René  
 
 
 20. U.N. Charter art.1, para. 3.  
 21. U.N. Charter art. 55(c). 
 22. See Schachter, supra note 14, at 53 (explaining how the major powers 
preferred including human rights as a purpose or objective within the Charter 
without enumerating rights within the Charter or forming a separate treaty, as 
suggested by the Latin American group). 
 23. See Eleanor Roosevelt, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, 
Statement during the General Assembly’s Adoption of the UDHR (Dec. 9, 1948), 
in DEP’T ST. BULL., Dec. 19, 1948, at 751 (emphasizing that the UDHR is not 
intended to be a treaty or an international agreement but a set of broad principles of 
rights and freedoms). 
 24. See MORSINK, supra note 19, at 4. 
 25. Schachter, supra note 14, at 55. 
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Cassin, was primarily responsible for the drafting process of the 
UDHR; he later received a Nobel Peace Prize for his work.26 
Cassin’s draft was grounded in natural law principles27 and 
visualized the structure of human rights as a temple founded on four 
pillars: civil, social, political, and economic rights.28 While 
considering the UDHR, some representatives of the Economic and 
Social Committee (“ECOSOC”) expressed concern about the lack of 
enforcement provisions.29 However, the ECOSOC unanimously 
agreed to forward the draft to the U.N. General Assembly.30 
The draft UDHR was next taken up by the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly, where things did not go as smoothly.31 Cold War 
tensions had “reached a new level of intensity”32 and the Soviet 
Union insisted that the Third Committee reproduce the work of the 
commission and “debate and vote on the whole Declaration, article 
by article and line by line.”33 Eventually, after over two months of 
debates, and owing in large part to the diplomatic efforts of Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Charles Malik of Lebanon, the UDHR was forwarded 
to the General Assembly where it was adopted on December 10, 
 
 26. See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1998) (highlighting Cassin’s career 
as a preeminent comparative lawyer who was previously employed as Charles de 
Gaulle’s principal legal advisor in World War II and was responsible for 
rehabilitating the French administrative system after the war). 
 27. See Schachter, supra note 14, at 55-6 (“[I]t is pretty clear that the 
philosophic perspective of the drafting bodies was in the natural law orientation. 
Nobody even suggested that the [UDHR] or the other instruments should be based 
on existing positive law.”). 
 28. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 162 
(Richard Pierre Claude et al. eds., Univ. of Pa. Press 3d ed. 2006) (describing 
Cassin’s fifth aspect of his natural law formulation as the “pediment of the [human 
rights] temple,” which symbolized the harmonization of human rights provisions 
and governments’ support of human rights). 
 29. See Cheng, supra note 15, at 265 (noting comments by the Dutch, New 
Zealand, Denmark and Soviet delegates that the UDHR would be “meaningless” if 
it lacked an enforcement mechanism). 
 30. See Glendon, supra note 26, at 1160. 
 31. See id. (quoting Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement that “[w]e thought we were 
presenting such a good draft that there would be very little discussion. We found 
we were mistaken. In the big committee they argued every word . . . . And so we 
had some terrible times in Paris.”). 
 32. Richard N. Gardner, The Genesis of the Declaration: A Fresh Examination, 
11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 27, 39 (1999). 
 33. Id. 
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1948 by a vote of forty-eight in favor, none opposing, and eight 
abstaining.34 
C. THE NORMATIVE IMPACT OF THE UDHR 
The newly-adopted UDHR was viewed by its framers as “a first 
step in a great evolutionary process.”35 The delegates agreed that it 
would have no binding authority over states, but they hoped that it 
“would define the human rights which states undertook to recognize 
and would serve as a criterion to guide and stimulate them.”36 The 
United States, in particular, was adamant that the UDHR “was not a 
legal document and possessed no legally binding force,”37 but was 
instead “a declaration of basic principles of human rights and 
freedoms.”38 
In introducing the document, the President of the General 
Assembly pointed out that, although the UDHR neither effectuates 
human rights nor contains provisions for their enforcement, its 
impact would still be profound because: 
It is the first occasion on which the organized community of 
nations has made a declaration on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and it has the authority of the body of 
the United Nations as a whole, and millions of people, men, 
women, and children all over the world, many miles from 
Paris and New York, will turn for help, guidance and 
inspiration to this document.39 
 
 
 34. See Glendon, supra note 26, at 1162 (noting that the General Assembly 
gave Charles Malik of Lebanon and Eleanor Roosevelt a standing ovation); see 
also Gardner, supra note 32, at 39 (noting that the UDHR passed at 3:00 a.m. and 
that “the Soviet Union and its satellites, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa” abstained 
from the vote). 
 35. See Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 354 (quoting the Verbatim Record of the 
General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 166, U.N. Doc. A/PV 
(Dec. 10, 1948)). 
 36. See Cheng, supra note 15, at 266 (quoting the Mexican Representative). 
 37. Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 357. 
 38. Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 751. 
 39. See Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 354 (quoting the Verbatim Record of the 
General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 166, U.N. Doc. A/PV 
(Dec. 10, 1948)). 
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Other delegates echoed this conviction of the UDHR’s moral 
power throughout the drafting procedure. The Belgian representative 
described the UDHR as having “a moral value and authority which is 
without precedent in the history of the world.”40 He continued: 
There will be, therefore, very great moral prestige and moral 
authority attaching to this [d]eclaration. Therefore the man in 
the street claiming certain rights would not simply be an 
isolated voice crying in the wilderness; it will be a voice 
upheld by all the peoples of the world represented at this 
Assembly.41 
The drafters were explicit that the moral authority of the UDHR 
was not diminished by its lack of provision for legal enforcement. As 
the representative of the United Kingdom explained during the Third 
Committee debates, the UDHR had “great moral authority, through 
the proclamation of an ideal, even though it could not impose 
specific obligations.”42 In the words of Professor Hersch Lauterpacht, 
who felt strongly that the document’s authority was called into 
question by its lack of legal status, the drafters maintained that: 
[A]ny . . . inconsistency between the fact of the general 
agreement as to what are fundamental human rights and the 
refusal to recognize them as juridically binding in the sphere 
of conduct was fully resolved by the acknowledgment of their 
validity in the realm of conscience and ethics.43 
Consequently, the incipient human rights regime was founded on a 
profound statement of the moral will of the international community 
whose passage “was dependent upon rejection of its bindingness 
upon sovereign states.”44 The UDHR’s intentionally limited legal 
 
 40. Id. at 355. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 359-60 (quoting A/C.3/SR.89, p.2). 
 43. Id. at 357. 
 44. Kenneth Henley, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, in UNIVERSAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL ORDER IN A DIVIDED WORLD 174 (David A. Ready et al. 
eds., Roman & Littlefield 2005) (explaining how the lack of legally binding 
authority in the UDHR exacerbated the “puzzle of vindication” which he identifies 
as both the absence of “practical reality to supposed human rights” and the absence 
of “any consensus about which rights should be universal and who possesses 
them”). 
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impact would have lasting results upon the development and 
character of the international human rights regime. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AS A MORAL ENTERPRISE 
Although the adoption of the UDHR generated pro-human rights 
momentum, as a result of Cold War political tensions the drafting of 
the two conventions making up the International Bill of Rights was 
not complete until the late 1960s.45 Even after the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR entered into legal force in 1976, policing compliance with 
human rights law remained heavily morally inflected. As such, 
NGOs developed the practice of “naming and shaming” governments 
into remedying human rights violations.46 
Despite the absence of perfect legal enforcement of human rights 
law, “[s]lowly, imperceptibly, how any state treated any human 
being became, in principle and to some extent in fact, ‘of 
international concern,’ everybody’s business.”47 In this way, the 
UDHR fostered the belief that not only is compliance with human 
rights norms a moral duty on the part of states; the entire 
international community is morally obligated not to stand by in the 
face of a government’s abuse of its citizens. 
A. THE DELAY IN ACHIEVING AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 
The adoption of the UDHR proved to be a high water mark for 
global consensus on the substance of human rights. Progress on the 
International Bill of Rights was quickly stymied by Cold War 
ideological divisions.48 In 1952, the General Assembly agreed to split 
 
 45. See Glendon, supra note 26, at 1173 (noting the disappointment of the 
UDHR’s framers at the “scandalous politicization of U.N. agencies” that stalled 
the implementation of human rights projects under the UDHR). 
 46. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 63, 67 (2004) (noting that “the core of [NGOs’] methodology is [their] 
ability to investigate, expose, and shame”). 
 47. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 31, 34 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin, Human Rights]. 
 48. See Leslie Armour, Economic Rights and Philosophical Anthropology, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
41 (William Sweet ed., Univ. of Ottawa Press 2003) (remarking that at the time 
that the UDHR was adopted, human rights were divided into “traditional personal 
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the project into two separate conventions,49 with the ICCPR 
representing the liberal democratic focus on individual rights, and the 
ICESCR representing the Eastern Bloc’s focus on collective rights.50 
The drafts of these documents were presented to the General 
Assembly in 1954, but were not adopted until December 16, 1966.51 
They came into force ten years later following ratification by thirty-
five parties.52 These two conventions were “only the inaugural salvo 
of what would become a streak of successive international treaties 
that sought to entrench minimal guarantees for human rights 
protections.”53 States have subsequently widely acceded to a number 
of international covenants that create domestic legal obligations vis-
à-vis their citizens.54 
 
rights and liberties” on one hand, and “economic rights” on the other). 
 49. See JOYCE, supra note 3, at 59 (concluding that the two Covenants are 
effectively part of one piece used to implement the Charter as the General 
Assembly simultaneously adopted both in 1966, and further noting that a number 
of members of the Human Rights Commission asserted that it would be not only 
impossible but also meaningless to recognize the rights enumerated in one 
Covenant without also recognizing the rights enumerated in the other). 
 50. See Armour, supra note 48, at 41 (differentiating between the West and the 
Eastern Bloc by explaining the expansiveness of freedom of speech and religion 
and political freedoms in the West versus the low unemployment rates, universal 
healthcare, and general accessibility of free education in Eastern Bloc nations). 
 51. G.A. Res. 2200, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 52. See JOYCE, supra note 3, at 46; see also Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
bodies/ratification (follow “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (listing the current 164 parties to the 
ICCPR); id. (follow “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights” hyperlink) (listing the current 160 parties to the ICESCR). 
 53. Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights 
Nongovermental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 261, 268 (2004). 
 54. Louis Henkin, Lecture, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, 
and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) [hereinafter 
Henkin, Lecture] (observing that states have chosen to adopt international 
covenants despite their reluctance to relinquish their sovereignty); see also Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, 
supra note 52 (listing the current states that are party to the human rights 
conventions as follows: 140 states are currently parties to the Genocide 
Convention; 193 to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 146 to the 
Convention Against Torture; 173 to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination; and 185 to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women). 
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Although the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR signified a 
“seismic shift” that “mov[ed] the notion of human rights from one of 
vague moral principles to legally binding norms,”55 it did not draw 
global attention the way the proclamation of the UDHR had.56 
Although the new legal obligations provided a welcome tool for 
promoting respect for human rights by states, their late arrival on the 
scene meant that they were incorporated into a pre-existing system of 
policing compliance, one based upon the moral imperatives of the 
UDHR. In the absence of binding international law, the UDHR alone 
had provided only “the blueprint that would serve to guide virtually 
all human rights developments from 1948 forward.”57 This resulted 
in an entrenched reliance on tools for encouraging compliance that 
were dependent on moral rhetoric arising out of the UDHR’s 
resounding call to responsibility. 
B. “NAMING AND SHAMING” 
Describing the international human rights regime in 1998, Louis 
Henkin said: “[s]tates can be shamed, and the system resorts 
increasingly to mobilizing shame.”58 This mobilization of shame has 
been a primary focus of the work of human rights NGOs.59 
Organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
report abuses of human rights in order to expose violators to moral 
opprobrium.60 
 
 55. Blitt, supra note 53, at 268. 
 56. JOYCE, supra note 3, at 46 (attributing the scant attention paid to the two 
covenants to a general apathy with which the world regarded human rights absent a 
“blatant violation of human rights”). 
 57. Blitt, supra note 53, at 267. 
 58. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 44. 
 59. See Leonard Rubenstein, Response by Leonard S. Rubenstein, 26 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 879, 881 (2004) (characterizing part of the “urgent business” of NGOs as 
informing public opinion and impacting the ways in which political leaders 
respond to human rights violations). 
 60. See Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in 
International Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 820 
(2007) (explaining that Amnesty International employs advertisements, print 
media, and the Internet as major tools in its shaming practices); see also id. at 829 
(using the Human Rights Watch’s 2005 report, which highlighted the U.S. 
government’s use of torture at Abu Ghraib, as an example of the type of moral 
rhetoric that NGOs call on when disseminating information to the public in order 
to influence public opinion with respect to a human rights violation). 
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William Schultz, the executive director of Amnesty International, 
identifies the goal of these efforts: “The eyes of the world [will 
shine] on the prisons and into the dark corners of police stations and 
military barracks all over the world to try to bring international 
pressure to bear upon governments which are committing human 
rights violations.”61 Similarly, Kenneth Roth, the executive director 
of Human Rights Watch, argues that organizations like Human 
Rights Watch have an impact because they use their resources to 
hold officials accountable for their actions by exposing those actions 
to the public and “generat[ing] public outrage.”62 
The UDHR has provided a “point of departure for the concern and 
activism of [NGOs].”63 These organizations have used the UDHR’s 
definition of human rights, and have identified actions that do not 
adhere to the UDHR as actions meriting a targeted response.64 The 
use of targeted moral outrage and the mobilization of shame to police 
compliance with human rights obligations is not limited to NGOs. 
For example, naming and shaming has become widely used by 
domestic human rights organizations.65 
C. THE VALUE OF THE MORAL FOCUS 
Critics of the international human rights regime “scoff at the 
primitive character of ‘human rights enforcement,’”66 and suggest 
 
 61. Bill Steigerwald, Human Rights and Wrongs, PITTSBURG TRIB. REV., Mar. 
29, 2003, available at http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists 
/steigerwald-/s_126235.html. 
 62. Roth, supra note 46, at 67. 
 63. WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: “A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” 44 (St. Martin’s Press 1998) (emphasizing that 
the UDHR could be used to criticize governments for failing to comply with 
international obligations). 
 64. See Gopalan, supra note 60, at 882 (referring in particular to Amnesty 
International, and comparing its function to that of a prosecutor). 
 65. Leonard S. Rubenstein, How International Human Rights Organizations 
Can Advance Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth, 
26 HUM. RTS. Q. 845, 848 (2004) (“Indeed, naming and shaming has become so 
universal a methodology that it is a staple not only of international human rights 
organizations but also of national and community-based human rights groups, UN 
agencies and rapporteurs, and even government-sponsored human rights reports.”) 
 66. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 41 (referencing the weak nature 
of enforcement resulting from the special character of international human rights 
law and human rights victims, which prevents “horizontal enforcement”). 
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that moral sanctions are a necessary substitute for legal sanctions 
“because international law instruments like the [UDHR] have no 
teeth.”67 According to this line of thinking, we are reduced to 
supporting human rights in moral terms because the legal structure is 
insufficient. 
While the lack of reliable legal sanction against violators indeed 
complicates efforts to vindicate the rights outlined in the UDHR, the 
reliance on moral arguments in the human rights context should not 
be viewed as a poor substitute for legal enforcement. Grounding 
human rights in the language of moral duty has promoted a widely-
held view of human rights commitments as something more 
powerful, even inspiring, than legal obligation. It has fostered the 
growth of an international community founded on the idea of our 
shared responsibility for each others’ well-being. As noted by 
Professor Louis Henkin, human rights norms have gained a jus 
cogens-like status that “is not the result of practice but the product of 
common consensus from which few dare dissent.”68 
III. THE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION TO PROTECT 
The widespread acceptance of the international community’s 
moral obligation to individuals has led to a recent “sophisticated 
attempt at establishing a moral guideline for international action in 
the face of humanitarian emergency,”69 the emerging Responsibility 
to Protect (“R2P”) norm. The concept was first introduced in late 
2001 by a commission sponsored by the government of Canada, but 
has quickly become part of the international discourse on 
humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty.70 R2P is regularly 
 
 67. See Gopalan, supra note 60, at 820 (maintaining that sometimes the 
offending state may not have ratified a legal instrument, making moral arguments a 
necessity). 
 68. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 39. 
 69. Graham Day & Christopher Freeman, Operationalising the Responsibility 
to Protect – the Policekeeping Approach, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 139, 139 
(2005) (referring to the 2001 report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty organized by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan). 
 70. See, e.g., International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Special 
Adviser with A Focus on the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.responsibilityto 
protect.org/index.php/edward-luck-special-adviser-with-a-focus-on-the-
responsibility-to-protect (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (reporting that with the 
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invoked by human rights advocates campaigning for international 
action on ongoing mass atrocities like those currently occurring in 
the eastern Congo and Darfur.71 The R2P provides a doctrinal basis 
for the moral instinct that “a nation forfeits its right to sovereignty if 
it unleashes or is unable to prevent massive human-rights abuses on 
its soil.”72 
The gradual process of operationalizing the R2P norm has 
required the international community to reaffirm its commitment to 
the principles outlined by the UDHR, and its emerging norm has also 
had another, unlooked for, result. It has provided a paradigm, the 
“individual responsibility to protect” for discussing individual 
activism on human rights.73 Campaigns comprising individuals and 
coalitions with large numbers of non-human rights professional 
members are an increasingly prominent and effective part of the 
human rights landscape. The success of these campaigns is 
dependent on an understanding that individuals are morally obligated 
to ensure the protection of human rights. This sense of an individual 
moral obligation can be traced directly back to the UDHR’s 
underlying philosophical premise that everyone bears the 
responsibility of promoting universal respect for human rights. 
 
 
support of the General Assembly, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has 
appointed a Special Adviser focused on R2P, whose role is to develop conceptual 
clarity and consensus for the evolving norm). 
 71. See Protecting the Vulnerable: What Congo Means for Obama, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2008, at 55, available at http://www.economist.com/opinion 
/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12601948 (arguing for intervention in the Congo and 
noting that “the UN has accepted a responsibility to protect people in such cases”); 
see also William G. O’Neill, The Responsibility to Protect Darfur, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 28, 2006, at 9, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0928/ 
p09s01-coop.html (arguing that under the responsibility to protect the United 
Nations should send a peacekeeping force to Darfur, and further noting that the 
Security Council does not need Sudan’s consent in order to do so). 
 72. Alex Perry, Why Congo’s Peacekeepers Are Coming Under Fire, TIME, 
Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1854483,00.html. 
 73. See The Individual Responsibility to Protect, http://www.ir2p.org/home 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (“States have a responsibility to protect their own 
populations from genocide and related crimes against humanity. Where they may 
fail, all of us must do all we can to prevent disaster.”). 
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A. THE MOVE TO R2P 
Historically, international law upheld a strict rule against 
intervention.74 However, there is increasing acceptance of the 
proposition that states that do not comply with their human rights 
obligations may not invoke the doctrine of nonintervention.75 In 
conjunction with that proposition, it also appears that “the scope of 
morally permissible humanitarian intervention [is] growing.”76 
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (“ICISS”) was established by the Government of 
Canada in order to answer a question posed by then U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan: “[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”77 
The ICISS responded with a new approach to humanitarian action: 
the R2P. Describing the process, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans said, 
“The whole point is to develop an international reflex response that 
goes, ‘Of course we have to do something. Let’s figure out what.’”78 
The ICISS sought to recharacterize sovereignty as responsibility 
rather than control, and noted a “transition from a culture of 
sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international 
accountability.”79 It stated that the practice of states and of the 
 
 74. See, e.g., Peter R. Baehr, “Humanitarian Intervention” A Misnomer?, in 
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND POWER POLITICS 25 (Michael C. Davis et al. eds., M.E. 
Sharpe 2004) (contrasting the general understanding of “aggression,” or 
intervention into domestic matters, with the idea that protection of human rights 
extends beyond the borders of any one state). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Steven P. Lee, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL ORDER IN A DIVIDED WORLD 152 (David A. 
Ready et al. eds., Rowman & Littlefield 2005) (reasoning that respect for national 
sovereignty can fluctuate based on changing circumstances, especially when 
humanitarian intervention is authorized by the United Nations). 
 77. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, MILLENIUM REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY GENERAL, ‘WE THE PEOPLES:’ THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 48 (U.N. Dep’t of Public Info.2000); see also ICISS Report, 
supra note 8, at 1 (citing the genocide in Rwanda as an example of a situation 
where not intervening can be as controversial as intervening). 
 78. Perry, supra note 72. 
 79. See ICISS Report, supra note 8, § 2.18; see also id. § 2.20 (emphasizing 
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Security Council demonstrated that a “basic consensus” existed that 
the international community must take action where states do not 
fulfill their duty to protect their citizens.80 
The ICISS’s report closed with a strong moral appeal “to embrace 
the idea of the responsibility to protect as a basic element in the code 
of global citizenship, for states and peoples, in the 21st century.”81 It 
concluded with reference to the principles elaborated in the UDHR: 
Nothing has done more harm to our shared ideal that we are 
all equal in worth and dignity, and that the earth is our 
common home, than the inability of the community of states 
to prevent genocide, massacre and ethnic cleansing. If we 
believe that all human beings are equally entitled to be 
protected from acts that shock the conscience of us all, then 
we must match rhetoric with reality, principle with practice. 
We cannot be content with reports and declarations. We must 
be prepared to act. We won’t be able to live with ourselves if 
we do not.82 
At the 60th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 191 world 
leaders unanimously endorsed the R2P. They agreed that: 
Each individual [s]tate has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it.83 
This endorsement affirmed the belief of the U.N. member states 
that mass humanitarian crises are everyone’s concern and bound the 
member states to the proposition that: “The international community, 
through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
 
that national law should still prevail and international options should only arise 
when national systems of justice cannot suffice). 
 80. Id. § 8.33 (remarking that there are two ways in which states can fail to 
fulfill their obligations: either by choice, or by their inability to do so). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. § 8.34. See generally UDHR, supra note 2 (including rights such as 
freedom and equality among fundamental human rights). 
 83. U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1*, ¶ 138 (Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World 
Summit Outcome]. 
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appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”84 
A few months later, Security Council resolution 1674, adopted on 
April 28th, 2006, reiterated the international community’s 
“responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”85 These 
developments evince a belief on the part of the U.N. member states 
that honoring their commitment to universal human rights requires 
the elevation of the R2P from a vague normative commitment to a 
full-fledged practical obligation. 
Current U.N. Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon recently proposed a 
three-pronged approach to implementing the R2P. Citing concerns 
that states might misuse the R2P, the Secretary-General called for the 
full development of strategies and mechanisms for operationalizing 
the R2P in a January 12, 2009 report.86 The Secretary-General’s three 
pillar strategy comprises (1) the state’s protection responsibilities,87 
(2) international assistance and capacity-building, and (3) “timely 
and decisive action” to save lives in the event of a failure of the first 
two pillars.88 Although the Secretary-General’s report admits that it 
does not offer a full vision of how to employ and enforce the R2P, it 
represents a move toward turning the rhetoric behind the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome into concrete action.89 
 
 84. Id. ¶ 139. 
 85. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
 86. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General on 
Implementing the responsibility to protect, delivered to the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (specifically responding to the R2P as 
discussed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome). 
 87. Id. at 10 (asserting that the responsibility to protect belongs to the state in 
the first instance, “because prevention begins at home and the protection of 
populations is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the twenty-first 
century”). 
 88. Id. at 2; see also U.N. News Service, Ban calls for three-pronged strategy 
to implement ‘responsibility to protect,’ (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.un.org/apps/ 
news/story.asp?NewsID=29732&Cr=protect&Cr1=peace. 
 89. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, supra note 86, ¶ 67 (emphasizing 
that, rather than attempting to renegotiate the wording of paragraphs 138 and 139 
of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, it would be more beneficial to focus on 
finding ways to implement the policy contained within them). 
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Some commentators point out that the “uncertainty surrounding 
the consequences of noncompliance” by the international community 
may “shed doubt on the notion that the R2P was meant to be an 
emerging hard norm of international law.”90 However, this 
uncertainty about the possibility of legal enforcement has not 
stopped the concept from inserting itself into the dialogue 
surrounding international human rights.91 Although attempts to move 
beyond rhetoric and to actually invoke the R2P have so far met with 
limited success,92 supporters hope that the power of the norm to 
capture the imagination will generate a groundswell of support for 
the idea that the international community is morally obligated to 
intervene in cases of extreme humanitarian crisis. In the words of 
former U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer: 
If we can reach the point where school children and their 
parents exclaim, “R2P Ends Atrocity Crimes,” and 
policymakers ultimately comprehend this siren call of their 
peoples stamped on bumper stickers and broadcast through 
enlightened corporate sponsors, then we will know that the 
responsibility to protect has a fighting chance of diminishing, 
perhaps even ending, atrocity crimes in our own time, on our 
watch, and within our moral universe.93 
B. INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISM AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP 
Today, some of the most vigorous campaigning for state 
compliance with human rights obligations is done by private 
individuals and coalitions of individual activists. Amnesty 
International is an early example of the involvement of non-
 
 90. See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 118 (2007) (implying that with a 
lack of strict enforcement mechanisms, responsibility to protect may have been 
intended simply as “soft law or a political principle”). 
 91. See David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect, 
40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 111, 111 (2007) (stating further that “it has invited 
both praise and skepticism”). 
 92. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) 
(expanding the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Darfur, and 
authorizing the United Nations Mission in Sudan to “use all necessary means” to 
protect the civilian population). 
 93. Scheffer, supra note 91, at 135. 
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professional activists in the effort to enforce international human 
rights law.94 In the words of Harold Koh, Legal Advisor for the U.S. 
State Department: 
International human rights law is enforced, I would say, not 
just by nation-states, not just by government officials, not just 
by world historical figures, but by people like us, by people 
with the courage and commitment to bring international 
human rights law home through a transnational legal process 
of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.95 
Especially on issues where mass atrocity is involved, Koh’s 
“people like us” are often the loudest voices calling for an end to the 
violence and respect for human rights. Movements like the Save 
Darfur coalition, which comprise a huge network of individual 
activists in addition to NGOs, are at the vanguard of the campaign to 
end ongoing mass atrocities and ensure protection of human rights.96 
It appeals to potential members’ sense of moral outrage and offers 
individuals the opportunity to “help end the genocide by taking small 
steps that can make a big difference for the people of Darfur.”97 One 
of its most visible efforts has been the Global Days for Darfur; 
during the second Global Day, participants gathered outside of 
Sudanese embassies worldwide and blew rape whistles and set off 
alarms to draw attention to issue of sexual violence in Darfur.98 
These rallies along with massive letter writing campaigns and teach-
ins represent a commitment to the idea that individual moral choices  
 
 
 94. See JOYCE, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that in the late 1970s “Amnesty 
International has mobilized its 100,000 members in professional, religious and 
local groups in fifty countries in the battle against torture”). 
 95. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 
74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1417 (1999). 
 96. See generally Save Darfur, http://savedarfur.org (last visited Sept. 21, 
2009) (stating that the coalition’s purpose is to “utilize media outreach, public 
education, targeted coalition building and grassroots mobilization to pressure 
policymakers and other decision-makers in the United States and abroad to help 
the people of Darfur”). 
 97. See Save Darfur, Take Action, http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/take 
_action (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (giving examples like lobbying a member of 
Congress, planning local events and educating others). 
 98. See Save Darfur, About Us, http://savedarfur.org/pages/global_campaigns/ 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2009). 
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can have a big impact in combating ongoing atrocities around the 
world. 
Similarly, the Genocide Intervention network invites potential 
members to “mak[e] a powerful statement to our political leaders that 
there is a large and committed group of citizens who are concerned 
about ending and preventing genocide.”99 STAND, the student wing 
of the Genocide Intervention Network, “is devoted to creating a 
sustainable student network that actively fights genocide wherever it 
may occur.”100 These network creation efforts are dependent on 
mobilizing moral outrage and a shared belief that individuals have a 
moral duty to take action to help others, even if their efforts 
ultimately do not have much impact on the lives of those they are 
trying to help. 
College students have been particularly quick to adopt the moral 
rhetoric of an individual responsibility to act and have been an 
extremely vocal constituency in the fight against genocide. On its 
website, STAND notes that the anti-genocide effort “has been called 
the fastest-growing student movement in the world today.101 STAND 
itself has over 850 chapters at schools worldwide.102 Additionally, 
social networking websites indicate evidence of numerous groups 
dedicated to raising awareness of and fighting genocide.103 
These organizations that rely upon exhortations to, for example, 
“Act Now to Protect Civilians in Eastern Congo”104 share a basic 
 
 99. Genocide Intervention Network, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.genocideintervention.net/network/faq (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). 
 100. STAND, http://www.standnow.org/about; see also STAND, 
http://www.standnow.org/about/who (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) (noting that 
STAND was originally called “S.T.A.N.D.: Students Taking Action Now Darfur!” 
and later changed its name to “STAND, the student-led division of the Genocide 
Intervention Network” in order “to reflect STAND’s broadened focus on multiple 
conflicts and new partnership” with the Genocide Intervention Network). 
 101. STAND, http://www.standnow.org/about/success (last visited Sept. 21, 
2009). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) 
(returning a list of over 500 groups in a search for “genocide”). 
 104. See STAND Act Now to Protect Civilians in Eastern Congo!, 
http://www.standnow.org/blog/act-now-protect-civilians-eastern-congo (claiming 
that advertisements in major European newspapers prompted the UK government 
to change its position in favor of sending troops to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo). 
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premise that we, as individuals, are responsible for each other. A new 
initiative called the Individual Responsibility to Protect (“iR2P”) 
makes this assumption explicit. It asks individuals to sign a pledge 
beginning “I believe I have an individual ‘responsibility to protect’” 
and to “avow[] to use whatever influence is at their disposal to help 
save lives wherever and whenever communities are at risk of mass 
atrocities.”105 This commitment echoes the language of the UDHR 
requiring “every individual” to work “to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms” and “to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance.”106 
This emerging iR2P norm owes its existence partially to the fact 
that the combination of international political realities and absence of 
strong legal enforcement of human rights means that, all too often, 
states can get away with shirking their obligations to comply with 
international human rights law. Consequently, in the words of John 
Prendergast,107 “what we need, all over this country, is people who 
are willing to stand up and make noise whenever there is a situation 
that demands the United States[‘] attention and our action.”108 In this 
way, an individual ethic of responsibility has arisen at least in part in 
order to fill the gap left by states. 
But although this ethic of responsibility plays a utilitarian role, its 
origins are more complex than simply filling a compliance gap. The 
emergence of the iR2P norm is directly traceable to the UDHR. 
James Avery Joyce makes the point that the “sweeping” language of 
the UDHR “leaves nobody any excuse to think that responsibility for 
observing its terms is a job to be left to someone else.”109 The 
drafters’ intention was to make clear that states could not escape 
their responsibility to protect and promote human rights, but their 
paradigm-shifting call for accountability has resulted in a move from 
a world order in which a state’s treatment of its citizens was 
considered nobody’s business to a shared belief that we are all 
 
 105. The Individual Responsibility to Protect, http://www.ir2p.org/pledge/. 
 106. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 107. See Enough, About Us, http://www.enoughproject.org/about (describing 
John Prendergast as an Africa expert and co-founder of Enough, which works “to 
build a permanent constituency to prevent genocide and crimes against 
humanity”). 
 108. STAND, Testimonials, http://www.standnow.org/testimonials. 
 109. JOYCE, supra note 3, at 51. See generally UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. 
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individually responsible for preventing suffering, wherever it may 
occur. 
CONCLUSION 
The UDHR’s affirmation of “the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”110 was 
drafted as a direct moral response to the evils of Nazi Germany.111 
That its preamble noted that “disregard and contempt for human 
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the 
conscience of mankind”112 indicates the pressing need the drafters 
felt to “come to an agreement about a universal moral code.”113 
The contemporary normative impact of this “moral consensus 
about human rights”114 is profound. Despite the increasing legal 
entrenchment of the international human rights regime, the effort to 
police compliance with human rights remains a fundamentally moral 
enterprise. Although this occurred in part because of the delays to 
legalization caused by Cold War politics and the resistance to 
applying legal sanctions to violators arising out of state sovereignty, 
it also owes a great deal to the enduring power of the UDHR’s call 
for moral responsibility. 
The UDHR’s fundamental premise that all members of the 
international community share the responsibility for ensuring the 
universal protection of human rights underlies current efforts to 
operationalize the emerging Responsibility to Protect norm. The 
spirit of the UDHR can be seen even more clearly in the increasing 
numbers of individual activists campaigning for an end to mass 
atrocities out of a sense of moral responsibility for the fates of far 
away victims whom they will never meet. This concept of an 
individual Responsibility to Protect bears out Elie Wiesel’s statement 
that: “The defense of human rights has, in the last fifty years, become 
 
 110. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 111. See MORSINK, supra note 19, at 37 (describing the process of selecting 
certain articles for inclusion and arguing that “the motif that runs throughout these 
adoptions and rejections is that the [UDHR] was adopted to avoid another 
Holocaust or similar abomination”). 
 112. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 113. MORSINK, supra note 19, at 36. 
 114. Id. 
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a kind of worldwide secular religion.”115 It demonstrates that the 
UDHR’s strong moral call to shared responsibility was ultimately 
powerful enough to reach beyond its intended recipients in state 
houses and parliaments, and to be heard by ordinary citizens around 
the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 115. Elie Wiesel, Voices: A Tribute to Human Rights, in THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND 3 (Yael Danieli et. 
al. eds., Baywood Publ’g Co. 1999). 
